A Schumpeterian growth model is developed to investigate how environmental policy affects economic growth when environmental policy also affects the direction of technical change. In contrast to previous models, production and pollution abatement technologies are embodied in separate intermediate good types. A set of stylized facts related to pollution emission, environmental policy, and pollution abatement expenditures is presented, and it is shown that the developed model is consistent with these stylized facts. It is shown analytically that a tightening of the environmental policy unambiguously directs research efforts toward pollution abatement technologies and away from production technologies. This directed technical change reduces economic growth and pollution emission growth. Simulation results indicate that even large environmental policy reforms have small economic growth effects. However, these economic growth effects have relatively large welfare effects which suggest that static models and exogenous growth models leave out an important welfare effect of environmental policy.
Introduction
Extensive empirical work provides evidence suggesting that a tighter environmental policy stimulates environmental innovation (e.g., Brunnermeier and Cohen 2003; Johnstone and Labonne 2006; Popp 2006; Arimura et al. 2007; Ambec et al. 2011; Haščič et al. 2012; Aghion et al. 2016 ).
The question is: does this stimulation come at the expense of other types of research? If so, environmental policy might have a negative effect on economic growth.
In this paper, I develop a Schumpeterian growth model to investigate how a tighter environmental policy affects economic growth when environmental policy also affects the direction of research efforts. The model is constructed such that it matches several stylized facts concerning pollution emission, environmental policy, and pollution abatement expenditures. I show analytically that a tighter environmental policy unambiguously reduces the economic growth rate as well as the growth rate of pollution emission. However, when the model is calibrated to the US economy, simulations indicate that even large environmental policy reforms barely affect the economic growth rate. This finding appears remarkably robust to changes in parameter values and calibration targets. Nevertheless, the simulations indicate that the economic growth effects constitute a large share of the overall welfare effects of environmental policy changes, as even small changes in growth rates have large level effects in the long run. Thus, the results indicate that static models and exogenous growth models (like the DICE model) leave out an important welfare effect of environmental policy.
Besides the policy implications, this analysis also contributes to the literature on directed technical change and the environment by developing a novel modeling strategy. Specifically, I develop a Schumpeterian growth model where production and pollution abatement technologies are embodied in separate intermediate good types. The R&D sector is bifurcated into two subsectors: one for production technologies and one for pollution abatement technologies. In contrast, Hart (2004 Hart ( , 2007 and Ricci (2007a) assume that production and pollution abatement technologies are embodied in the same intermediate goods. In their work, intermediate goods can be improved along two dimensions: productivity and environmental friendliness. As more environmentally friendly intermediates are less productive, R&D firms face a design trade-off when attempting to develop higher intermediate good qualities.
To illustrate the difference between the two modeling strategies, imagine a firm obtaining a patent on a new quality of a certain engine type. If production and pollution abatement technologies are embodied in the same intermediate goods (as assumed by Hart [2004 Hart [ , 2007 and Ricci [2007a] ), the new engine quality is both more powerful and more environmentally friendly compared to the previous qualities. If the two technologies are embodied in separate intermediates (as in this analysis), one firm would obtain a patent on a more powerful engine, while another firm would obtain a patent on a catalyst, that could be implemented into the engine to reduce pollu-1 Introduction tion emission. Hence, innovation arrivals of pollution abatement technologies are detached from innovation arrivals of production technologies. If a firm develops both production and pollution abatement technologies, these will be developed in separate R&D units. One unit can be successful during a certain time interval while the other fails. If the two technologies are embodied in the same intermediate, the firm has only one R&D unit. Either the firm develops a more productive and more environmentally friendly intermediate good quality, or no innovation occurs.
Separating the two technology types results in a more realistic representation of the innovation process for at least two reasons. Firstly, it seems natural to assume that the innovation arrivals of production and pollution abatement technologies are independent. Certainly, it is possible to invent a better catalyst without also inventing a more powerful engine. Secondly, to a large extent, private firms are only willing to conduct research, when the developed ideas can be protected. As patents are granted very specific components rather than entire systems, it seems appropriate to assume that production and pollution abatement technologies are developed separately.
Additionally, this framework seems to foster tractability and empirical relevance. The policy implications for economic growth are derived analytically, and they are unambiguous. In addition, the model presented below matches several stylized facts concerning pollution emission, environmental policy, and pollution abatement expenditures. Finally, in contrast to some other models in the literature, research occurs simultaneously in both R&D subsectors which seems like the more empirically relevant case.
Besides the works by Hart (2004 Hart ( , 2007 and Ricci (2007a) , this analysis relates to several strands of literature. Firstly, it is related to a large body of literature investigating how environmental policy affects economic growth (e.g., Gradus and Smulders 1993; Bovenberg and de Mooij 1997; Nielsen et al. 1995; Hettich 1998; Schou 2002) . These studies are typically novel in their identification of channels through which environmental policy might enhance growth, but they do not feature directed technical change. 1 Secondly, the methodology used in this paper is closely related to works by Smulders and de Nooij (2003) , Brock and Taylor (2010) , and André and Smulders (2014) . Specifically, these works develop growth models which match certain stylized facts to answer environmentally related questions. The main goal of this paper is not to explain the stylized facts presented below. Rather, the model is designed to match the stylized facts to ensure that it is empirically relevant. Other models in the literature have been developed with little or no regards to empirical tendencies. As a result, it is difficult to assess the usefulness of their policy implications.
Thirdly, this paper relates to a growing body of literature investigating how environmental pol-icy affects the direction of technological change in endogenous growth models. 2 In these works, it is usually assumed that output is produced using a constant elasticity of substitution production technology with two input types: clean and dirty. Pollution emission is an unavoidable by-product associated with dirty input use while no pollution emission comes from clean input use. Environmental policy can then skew incentives such that it becomes relatively more attractive to conduct research in clean input technologies. The modeling strategy developed in this paper might be a useful alternative to the clean-dirty-input approach. Specifically, the modeling strategy developed in this paper seems appropriate when considering pollutants, where emissions can be substantially reduced by end-of-pipe technologies. 3
The model developed in this paper has the advantage that it clearly illustrates how environmental policy influences the intersectoral labor allocation between production and research as well as the intrasectoral labor allocations for these two sectors. In contrast, some studies have definitively shut down intersectural labor allocation effects. Acemoglu et al. (2012) assume a constant labor input in both production and research. Thus, environmental policy can only affect the intrasectoral labor allocations. As the trade-off between production and research is eliminated, their model does not qualify as a (complete) endogenous growth model (Pottier et al. 2014) . In this paper, I
show that environmental policy will affect the intersectoral labor allocation except for in a special knife-edge case. This intersectoral effect is important when investigating economic growth effects of environmental policy changes, as the labor reallocation between production and research implies intertemporal changes in the production capacity.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents stylized facts related to pollution emission, environmental policy, and pollution abatement expenditures. Section 3 presents a Schumpeterian growth model consistent with the stylized facts. The policy implications of the model are derived analytically in Section 4, and natural extensions of the model are discussed in Section 5.
Section 6 provides a quantitative analysis, and the results are discussed in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
Stylized Facts
Some of the stylized facts presented in this section serve as motivation for model assumptions made in the subsequent section. The remaining facts serve as a first empirical test of the model. 4 In 2 E.g., Saint-Paul (2002) , Smulders and de Nooij (2003) , Grimaud and Rouge (2008) , Acemoglu et al. (2012) , André and Smulders (2014) , van den Bijgaart (2014), and Hemous (2015) .
3 An example would be SO 2 emissions. de Bruyn (1999, p. 172-175) argues that end-of-pipe technologies were the most important determinant for the substantial reduction in SO 2 emissions from 1980 to 1990 for West Germany and the Netherlands.
4 Some of the stylized facts presented below are to my knowledge new to the literature. The rest have been presented in either Taylor (2005, 2010) or Botta and Kozluk (2014) . Section 3.3, I show how the model presented in Section 3 matches the stylized facts presented in this section. Following Brock and Taylor (2005, 2010) , I focus on air pollution, and in particular, the air pollutants CO, NO x , SO 2 (or SO x ), VOC (volatile organic compounds), and CO 2 . As shown in the left panel of Figure 1 , US pollution intensities -defined as emissions over GDP -decreased almost monotonically for all five air pollutants over the period 1940-2014. The right panel of Figure 1 shows that US pollution emissions did not exhibit the same clear trend. Instead, emissions for the four pollutants CO, NO x , SO 2 , and VOC increased until around 1970. After 1973, CO, SO 2 , and VOC emissions decreased rapidly. The exception is CO 2 emission which increased systematically over the period, while NO x emissions did not decrease notably before the late 1990es. As income increased with an approximately constant growth rate throughout the period, it has been hypothesized that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between income and pollution emission.
Pollution emissions and intensities
This relationship is usually referred to as the environmental Kuznets curve in the literature (see Stern 2014) . These tendencies lead to the first stylized fact.
Stylized Fact 1. Pollution emissions might increase or decrease while income increases. Meanwhile, pollution intensities decrease with income.
A model consistent with Stylized Fact 1 predicts that pollution emissions grow slower than income. Generally, OECD countries experienced a decline in the five pollution intensities during the period 1990-2012. 5 In fact, it seems like pollution intensities are decreasing over time and with environmental policy stringency. Let environmental policy stringency be measured by the economywide environmental policy stringency (EPS) index described by Botta and Kozluk (2014) . The EPS index is defined from zero to six, where zero is when environmental policy is nonexistent and six is a very stringent environmental policy. FIGURE 2: The economy-wide environmental policy stringency (EPS) index. Data source: Botta and Kozluk (2014) . Notes: Environmental policy stringency is measured using the EPS index presented by Botta and Kozluk (2014) . Due to missing data, the 1990 value is used instead of the 1995 value for IRL.
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Stylized Fact 4. The tax revenue from environmentally related taxes is approximately a constant
share of GDP for long periods of time.
The theoretical model focuses on environmental taxes. As the tax revenues from environmentally related taxes seem to be a constant share of GDP, I will assume that the government adjusts environmental tax rates to ensure this relation. Using this policy rule, environmental tax rates must increase over time as pollution intensities decrease. Higher environmental tax rates translate into a stricter environmental policy, and thus, the EPS index value increases over time. 
Pollution abatement expenditures
An important component in most growth models designed to answer environmentally related questions is the pollution abatement expenditures. Data on this subject are relatively scarce. I focus on the US case for which the longest time series are available. The left panel of Figure 4 shows that Stylized Fact 5 provides strong evidence against models where pollution abatement expenditures must take up an increasing share of economic output over time to reduce pollution emission. This model class includes the model developed by Stokey (1998) .
The left panel of Figure 4 also shows that pollution abatement expenditures were roughly a constant share of GDP for the business sector during the period. The right panel of Figure 4 depicts pollution abatement expenditure shares by sector. The business sector had a share of over 60 pct. for the whole period, whereas each of the other two sectors never had a share above 30 pct.
This evidence leads to the final stylized fact. 
Stylized
The Model
The model is based on the Schumpeterian growth model presented by Aghion and Howitt (1998, p. 85-92) . I first present the general framework, then I solve for the market equilibrium, and finally I relate the model to the stylized facts presented above.
General framework
Time is continuous and denoted t ≥ 0. The economy admits a representative household, and welfare, U , is given by
where C t is aggregate consumption, P t is aggregate pollution emission, and u(·) is increasing and strictly concave in C t and decreasing in P t .
Production of final goods is conducted by N t production units (firms in the market economy).
Each production unit produces final goods using the production technology: is a quasi-fixed cost associated with production. The quasi-fixed cost reflects that a minimum input is required to produce, and that this requirement increases, as the production process becomes more advanced. 7
All final goods are consumed such that aggregate output, Y t , equals aggregate consumption:
Pollution is an unavoidable by-product of production. Inspired by the pollution function used 7 The quasi-fixed cost ensures that a market equilibrium with a finite number of production units exists. The proportionality between the leading-edge technology and the quasi-fixed cost ensures that the number of production units is constant over time in the market equilibrium. Substituting the leading-edge technology with the average technological level does not change the qualitative results, as the two technology measures grow at the same rate in the market equilibrium.
by Gradus and Smulders (1993) , pollution emission of production unit j, P jt , amounts to:
where Z jt is pollution abatement activity of the production unit. Aggregate pollution emission is given by: P t = Nt 0 P jt dj. Pollution abatement activities are conducted using abatement intermediates like filters and catalysts. Pollution abatement activity of production unit j amounts to 
Labor can also be used to conduct research. 
where 
For simplicity, let a and b be distributed according to G A (a) and
Finally, the economy is endowed withL units of labor which can be allocated to either production or research. The labor market clearing condition amounts tō
The market equilibrium
A production unit now corresponds to a firm. Firms in the final goods sector operate under perfect competition, and the government imposes a pollution (emission) tax. Profits, π f jt , are given by: (3.10) where p it is the price of production intermediate i, q ht is the price of abatement intermediate h,
and τ t > 0 is the pollution tax rate. All prices are in terms of final goods. Each firm j maximizes 0, 1] , and τ t as given. The first-order conditions imply that
hjt B ht
According to the following lemma, the final goods sector is always in a symmetric equilibrium. Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Firms enter the final goods sector until profits are driven to zero. Thus, the following equilibrium condition is imposed:
(3.13)
Motivated by Stylized Fact 4, I assume that the government adjusts the pollution tax rate, such that the tax revenue from the pollution tax remains a constant share of output:
where φ is the tax revenue from environmentally related taxes as share of output. I refer to the parameter φ as the environmental tax revenue parameter. A higher φ value means a tighter environmental policy.
An expression for N t is derived by substituting (3.11), (3.12), and (3.14) into (3.10) and employing equilibrium condition (3.13):
(3.15)
To ensure that N t > 0, the following parameter restriction is imposed:
Using (3.1), (3.2), and (3.15) a more convenient expression for output is obtained: Profits in the production intermediate subsector is given by: π A it = (p it − w t )x it N t , where w t denotes the wage rate and it is used thatx it = x ijt according to Lemma 1. The monopolists face the inverse demand function given by (3.11) when maximizing profits. Combining the first-order condition for firm i with (3.14) yields:
(3.17)
The price of production intermediate i is derived by substituting (3.14) and (3.17) into (3.11):
The price is the marginal cost of production multiplied by a constant markup.
Using the expression for the price, (3.8), (3.16), and (3.17), the equilibrium profit of monopolist i is obtained:
Profits in the abatement intermediate subsector is given by:
where it is used thatẑ ht = z hjt according to Lemma 1. The monopolists face the inverse demand function given by (3.12) when maximizing profits. Combining the first-order condition for firm h with (3.14)
yields:
Pollution abatement activity per final good firm is obtained from (3.4), (3.8), and (3.19):
Substituting (3.20) into (3.19) and rearranging terms:
The price of abatement intermediate h is derived by substituting (3.14) and (3.21) into (3.12):
Using the expression for the price and (3.21), the equilibrium profit of monopolist h is obtained:
In the R&D sector, entrepreneurs conduct research to invent higher intermediate good qualities.
If an entrepreneur is successful, he/she receives a patent (of infinite duration) on that intermediate good quality and becomes the new monopolist of that intermediate good. The value of a patent on the second highest quality is thereby destroyed. Hence, innovation is associated with creative destruction.
There is free entry into both R&D subsectors, and all R&D firms take the wage rate as given.
As the probability of inventing a new intermediate good quality is proportional to the labor input, firms will enter the R&D sector until the following research arbitrage conditions are fulfilled:
for n A it ≥ 0 and w t = λV 
where r t is the (risk-free) real interest rate. The instantaneous profit streams are discounted by modified interest rates which reflect the opportunity cost of investing in R&D firms (the real interest rate) and the risk of losing the monopoly position (the flow probabilities).
As new intermediate good qualities of a certain type invented at the same point in time are associated with the same technological level, the profit streams associated with monopolies on any of these qualities are the same. It then follows from (3.23), (3.24), and (3.25) that the same amount of research is conducted on each intermediate good, given the type. Hence,
and n B t ≡ 1 0 n B ht dh = n B ht in equilibrium. To simplify the analysis and ensure balanced growth, I assume that: u(C t , P t ) = ln(C t )−κE(P t ), where E (P t ) > 0 and κ ≥ 0. The parameter κ reflects the relative weight of pollution in the instantaneous utility function. A representative household solves the problem:
whereW t is financial wealth, and I t is a lump-sum government transfer. Using CRRA preferences yields similar qualitative results (see Section 5). Optimal behavior requires:
Following Ricci (2007a) , the government keeps a balanced budget by transferring the entire tax revenue to the representative household at all moments in time: The equilibrium labor allocation is determined by employing the clearing conditions for the labor market and the research arbitrage conditions. The wage rate is determined by substituting (3.16), (3.17), and (3.21) into the manufacturing clearing condition (3.5): 
It is shown in Appendix A.2 that dividing with w t on both sides and differentiating with respect to time (using Leibniz's rule), (3.28) and (3.29) can be rewritten as
,
where g L,t is the growth rate of labor devoted to manufacturing, L t .
Consider the following lemma:
Lemma 2. If the parameters ensure that n
To ensure that n A > 0 and n B > 0 in equilibrium, the following two parameter restrictions are imposed:
The equilibrium labor allocation is derived using, (3.9), (3.30), (3.31), and Lemma 2: 
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Stylized facts revisited
The model focuses on the business sector's pollution abatement expenditures which is motivated by Stylized Fact 6. In addition, I used Stylized Fact 4 to motivate the policy function (3.14). The model matches the remaining stylized facts endogenously. First, define pollution intensity as:
It follows directly from Proposition 1 that: Next, the environmental policy stringency measured by the EPS index corresponds to some monotone transformation of the pollution tax rate, τ t . Consider the government's tax rule expressed in terms of pollution intensity: φ = P t τ t . As the pollution intensity decreases, the pollution tax rate must increase which matches both Stylized Fact 2 and 3, i.e. the EPS index is negatively correlated with the pollution intensity and the EPS index increases over time.
Finally, aggregate and business sector pollution abatement expenditures are the total expenditures on pollution abatement for the final goods sector, as this is the only sector that pollutes. The pollution abatement expenditures are given by the cost of purchasing abatement intermediates for all final good firms: (1/α)z t w t = (1/α)χµ 2 φY t . Hence, aggregate and business sector pollution abatement expenditures are a constant share of output which fits well with the data presented in Figure 4 . Also, the model matches Stylized Fact 5 and 6, as aggregate and business sector pollution abatement expenditures can be a constant share of output while pollution emission falls (if φ is sufficiently large). 9
Policy Implications
To study how a tightening of the environmental policy affects economic growth, an unexpected increase in the environmental tax revenue parameter, φ, is analyzed. In reality, the government possesses many other environmental policy instruments besides environmental taxes. For the mechanisms described in this model, what matters is that pollution emission becomes more expensive when the environmental policy is tightened. The environmental tax revenue parameter can therefore be interpreted broadly as the technology-adjusted environmental policy stringency.
Consider the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If Parameter Restriction 1, 2 and 3 hold, then:
(1) Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The proposition highlights three labor allocation effects of a tightening of the environmental policy. The first effect is a production direction effect: reallocation of labor used for manufacturing.
A tightening of the environmental policy increases the price of pollution emission. This causes the demand for abatement intermediates to increase while the demand for production intermediates decreases. To ensure that supply equals demand, labor must be reallocated from the production to the abatement intermediate subsector.
The second effect is a research direction effect: reallocation of labor used for research. As the demand for abatement intermediates increases, so does the value of a patent in the abatement with the price (1/α)w t are substituted for intermediates with the relatively lower price (1/µ)w t . According to Proposition 3, a tightening of the environmental policy decreases the growth rates of output and pollution emission. The question is then: why can the potential inflow of labor from manufacturing to R&D never be strong enough to increase the growth rate of output? When a tightening of the environmental policy causes labor to flow from manufacturing to R&D, the reason is that profits in the intermediate goods sector have increased. However, this overall increase is entirely driven by the abatement intermediate subsector, as profits in the production intermediate subsector decrease unambiguously due to the production direction effect. Hence, the labor flow from manufacturing is directed entirely to the abatement R&D subsector, and the labor allocated to the production R&D subsector is reduced unambiguously.
As in other models featuring directed technical change, the relative profit between the two intermediate goods subsectors is determined by a price effect and a market size effect. The relative profit is given by: The size of the price effect is determined by the relative size of the two markups. Hence, the price effect is determined by technology and market power. Both are unaffected by environmental policy. Thus, the relative profit is only directly affected by environmental policy through the market size effect which is simply a different formulation of the production direction effect. The price effect still affects how strong the relative profit reacts to changes in the environmental policy. This insight is directly linked to the labor force allocation effect. When the price effect is large (α < µ) labor flows from R&D to manufacturing when the environmental policy is tightened which amplifies the effect of environmental policy on relative profits and the economic growth rate.
Meanwhile, the research direction effect ensures that research is conducted in both R&D subsectors. If, for instance, the profit stream associated with a patent on a new abatement intermediate becomes larger, more researchers will enter the abatement R&D subsector. As a result, the expected duration of a monopoly position in the abatement intermediate subsector is reduced which ensures that in equilibrium, it is equally attractive to conduct research in both R&D subsectors. This effect is eliminated in models with one-period patents, and it might cause innovation to permanently occur only in one R&D subsector.
Model Extensions
The assumption of logarithmic preferences in the instantaneous utility function might be considered problematic, as extensive empirical evidence suggests that the degree of relative risk aversion is above one (see Attanasio and Weber 1993; Okubo 2011; Havránek 2015) . To relax this assumption, consider the model from Section 3 with the instantaneous utility function
where θ is the degree of relative risk aversion. Most of the derivations from Section 3 are still valid.
However, the real interest rate is now given by: r = θg C + ρ. In Appendix A.6 I show that the environmental policy implications with respect to the economic growth rate as well as the growth rate of pollution emission are unchanged by this extension.
Furthermore, the absence of physical capital in the model might seem unappealing, as accumulation of physical capital usually plays a major role in economic growth models. In Appendix A.7 I sketch a model similar to the one presented in Section 3, but where physical capital is part of the production process. In this model, labor becomes an input in the final goods sector, and I assume that final good firms operate under monopolistic competition a la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . 10 Also, intermediate goods are produced using physical capital instead of labor. The long-run policy implications of the model are very similar to those of the model presented in Section 3: a tighter environmental policy will unambiguously dampen long-run economic growth and the long-run growth rate of pollution emission.
Simulations
In this section, the model from Section 3 with the instantaneous utility function given by (5.1) is simulated to investigate its quantitative policy implications. The model contains several parameters that are new to the literature. To obtain somewhat plausible parameter values, the model is calibrated to the US economy for which the most comprehensive data are available.
Calibration
The calibration procedure is divided into four steps. First, parameters present in other growth models are assigned values from previous papers: α = 0.4 and λ = 0.5 (from Ricci 2007a), and θ = 2.5 and ρ = 0.2 (from Groth and Ricci 2011) . Assuming that it is equally difficult to invent new production and abatement intermediate good qualities: η = λ = 0.5. The parameter β is estimated to be 0.7 using the procedure described in Appendix A.8. Total labor supply is normalized to one, and the parameter F (which only has a strong impact on the variable N ) is set to 0.1.
Second, the US tax revenues from environmentally related taxes were 1.09 pct. of GDP in 1994.
As φ should be interpreted as a measure of the overall environmental policy stringency and not just the tax revenues from environmentally related taxes as share of output, the φ value for the US, φ US , must have been at least 1.09 pct. In fact, φ US is probably considerably higher, as US environmental policy relies little on environmental taxes. As no empirical studies have estimated φ US , I use φ US = 1.09% and φ US = 10.9%. That is the minimum φ value and ten times the minimum value. The former serves as a lower bound, whereas the latter serves as an upper bound.
Third, the parameter χ is computed by matching aggregate pollution abatement expenditures with that of the US in 1994. These expenditures constituted about 1.61 pct. of GDP which correspond to (1/α)χµ 2 φ = 1.61% in the model. 11 Given values for φ and µ, χ can be computed.
I set µ equal to 0.8 as lower µ values results in a χ value above one for φ US = 1.09% which is inconsistent with the parameter restrictions. In Section 6.3 I show that the main results of this section are robust to a lower µ value given that the φ US value allows for a lower µ value.
Finally, the model is calibrated such that it matches the US growth rates of real GDP and pollution emission. Unfortunately, it is difficult to operationalize the variable P t , as it is unclear how to construct a single pollution emission measure. As in Section 2, I focus on air pollution. I construct a pollution emission index by indexing pollution emissions for CO, NO x , SO 2 , VOC, and 11 It might be argued that (1/α)χµ 2 φ corresponds to the business sector's pollution abatement expenditures.
Using the business sector's pollution abatement expenditures does not change the main conclusions of this exercise.
12 The index could also be computed using shadow prices as relative weights. However, the results are not sensitive to changes in the pollution growth rate used to calibrate the model. Putting all weight on either the fastest (CO 2 ) or the slowest (SO 2 ) growing pollutant does not change the main conclusions of the exercise indicating that the main conclusions can be obtained using any weighted average of the five growth rates.
Simulation results
Figure 5 depicts the change in the growth rates of output and pollution emission when the tax revenue from the pollution tax is increased for the two calibrations: φ US = 1.09% and φ US = 10.9%.
For both calibrations, the growth rate of output is weakly affected by environmental policy changes compared to the growth rate of pollution emission. Consider an increase of one percentage point (pp) in the tax revenue from the pollution tax as share of output (a substantial policy change).
This reform would decrease the growth rates of output by 0.025 and 0.003 pp, where the growth rates of pollution emission are reduced by 4.3 and 0.37 pp for φ US = 1.09% and φ US = 10.9%, respectively. The changes in both growth rates are strongly affected by the initial environmental tax revenue parameter value, but the economic growth effects of a tighter environmental policy are always small. FIGURE 5: Changes in the growth rates of output and pollution emission when the tax revenue from the pollution tax as share of output is increased.
Intuitively, the results should be understood in the following way. As the model matches the US pollution abatement expenditures as share of GDP which is a small number, the market for abatement technologies is relatively small. This results in a small labor input in the abatement R&D subsector. Since US pollution intensities have decreased notably during the last plus 40 years, pollution abatement research must have had a strong impact on pollution emission despite the relatively small input. Consequently, ln(ξ) becomes large when calibrating the model which explains the relatively large impact of environmental policy on the growth rate of pollution emission. 13
The relatively weak effect of environmental policy on economic growth is also a consequence of the relatively small market for abatement technologies. Only a small fraction of the labor force works in the two abatement subsectors. If environmental policy doubles or triples the market size for abatement technologies, the implied labor reallocation is relatively small. As a result, the input 13 Since ln(ξ) > ln(γ) spill-over effects are larger in the abatement R&D subsector compared to the production R&D subsector. This result aligns well with recent empirical evidence from patent citation data which suggests that knowledge spill-over effects from clean technologies are larger than knowledge spill-over effects from dirty technologies (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2014 ).
in the production R&D subsector is almost unaffected by significant environmental policy changes which lead to a relatively weak economic growth effect.
Another issue is how environmental policy affects the initial level of central variables given the technological level. Figure (2) reduces output and the wage rate, and (3) reduces pollution emission and intensity.
For φ US = 1.09% the increase in profits in the abatement intermediate subsector is sizable.
If, for instance, φ is increased from 1.09 to 2.09 pct., profits in this subsector almost double.
The result is intuitive. The tax revenue from the pollution tax almost doubles which means that the quantities of abatement intermediates produced increases by almost 100 pct. As the price of abatement intermediates is a constant markup over marginal costs and the wage rate is only weakly affected by the policy, the profits in the abatement intermediate subsector increase by almost 100
pct. On the other hand, the change in profits in the production intermediate subsector is much smaller (about 3 pct.), as the relative change in demand for production intermediates is only weakly affected by the policy. It appears from Figure 5 and 6 that the growth and level effects are amplified when φ US is reduced. A low φ US implies a large χ value due to the calibration procedure. A larger χ value implies more efficient pollution abatement. Thus, final good firms react with relatively more abatement, when the environmental policy is tightened for higher χ values. As the response is stronger, the growth and level effects are amplified.
It is often argued that a tighter environmental policy will decrease future growth substantially. Despite the numerically small economic growth effects of environmental policy, the welfare implications might be substantial as even small changes in a growth rate have large level effects in the long run. The left panel of Figure 7 shows the output level loss 50 years after an environmental policy change for the calibration based on φ US =1.09 %. Calibrating the model for other allowable φ US values only reduce the economic growth effects of environmental policy, and thus, the simulation results presented in Figure 7 can be viewed as the most pessimistic case. Holding the current output level constant, a one pp increase in the tax revenue from the pollution tax as share of output reduces output 50 years later by at most 1.21 pct. When the initial level effect is included, output is reduced by at most 2.09 pct. 50 years later. Another way to evaluate the welfare cost of environmental policy reforms is to consider how much the current consumption level must change to keep utility constant. I refer to this figure as the current consumption compensation (CCC). For this welfare measure, the pollution element in the instantaneous utility function matters. To avoid further assumptions on the instantaneous utility function, I assume that κ = 0. Accordingly, the computed CCC should be viewed as an upper bound. Details on how the CCC is computed are reported in Appendix A.9.
The right panel of Figure 7 shows CCC divided into a growth and a level component as well as the total CCC. The loss in growth accounts for about 30 pct. of the CCC, where the level component accounts for about 70 pct. Assuming that the policy change has no level effect on consumption, the CCC for a one pp increase in the tax revenue from the pollution tax as share of output is 0.4 pct. That is, the representative household demands a 0.4 pct. higher current consumption level with the new economic growth rate to be as well off as before the policy change.
The calculations presented in Figure 7 indicate that static models and exogenous growth models leave out a substantial part of the welfare effects of environmental policy reforms. The growth effect accounts for more than 50 pct. of the output level loss 50 years later, while it accounts for about 30 pct. of the CCC. Thus, despite the small effect on the economic growth rate, it is important to take the growth effects into account when evaluating the welfare effects of environmental policy reforms.
The relatively large welfare effects from seemingly small reductions in the economic growth rate are intuitive. When the economic growth rate is reduced, consumption is reduced at all future dates.
Despite the consumption discounting and the curvature of the instantaneous utility function, these consumption losses have a relatively large present value.
Sensitivity analysis
It is natural to wonder how sensitive the obtained results are to changes in the baseline parameter values and calibration targets. Table 2 shows reductions in the economic growth rates from a one percentage point increase in the tax revenue parameter, φ, from 2.18 to 3.18 pct. for simulations based on φ US = 2.18% and the baseline parameter values and calibration targets, and where only one parameter assumption or calibration target deviates from its baseline value. Attanasio and Weber (1993) find that 1.25 ≤ θ ≤ 3.33 for the US, and I investigate the two extreme cases θ = 1.25 and θ = 3.33. For the pollution emission growth rate (calibration) target, I use the growth rates of the fastest (CO 2 ) and the slowest (SO 2 ) growing air pollutants. I use µ = 0.4 and µ = 0.9 since the model behaves very differently for µ close to zero or one, as the markup in the abatement intermediate goods subsector becomes extremely large (for µ ≈ 0) or almost disappears (for µ ≈ 1).
The remaining parameters as well as the pollution abatement (calibration) target, (1/α)χµ 2 φ US , are multiplied and divided by two.
The model is calibrated for φ US = 2.18% (twice the minimum value) as some parameter assumptions are violated for φ US = 1.09% for several of the considered parameter and calibration target changes. Typically, the parameter assumptions ensuring that n B > 0 are violated. Using φ US = 2.18% allow sufficient flexibility for this sensitivity analysis. The results shown in Table 2 
Discussion
It is somewhat surprising that the economic growth effects of environmental policy changes are small in the simulation exercises, as several model assumptions amplify these effects. Starting with technology, there are three assumptions worth emphasizing. First, pollution has no negative effects on production. 14 As a result, environmental policy cannot boost productivity through a reduction in pollution emissions. Second, abatement technologies have no productivity-enhancing effects, as they can only reduce pollution emission. In reality, they might improve productivity through a decrease in resource use (see Porter and van der Linde 1995) . Third, spill-over effects between production and abatement technologies are ignored which increases the economic growth impact of labor reallocation within the R&D sector.
Two assumptions related to allocation mechanisms also amplify the economic growth effects of environmental policy changes. Firstly, the tax revenue from the pollution tax is transferred to the representative household. Alternatively, this tax revenue could finance subsidies to productivityenhancing research activities and thereby reduce the negative economic growth effect of a tighter environmental policy. Secondly, the representative household takes pollution emission as given and has additive preferences concerning consumption and pollution emission. If, instead, consumption and a clean environment are compliments, environmental policies reducing pollution emission increase the savings rate and thus the economic growth rate (see Mohtadi 1996) .
Given these considerations, it appears puzzling that economic growth effects of large environmental policy reforms are almost absent in the simulation exercises. Intuitively, the results can be explained the following way. As US pollution abatement expenditures only constitute a small fraction of GDP, the market for abatement technologies is small. Hence, environmental policy reforms that increase the market size of abatement technologies substantially, only reallocates a small fraction of the economies total resources. As a consequence, even large environmental policy changes have a small impact on research input in productivity-enhancing technologies.
All in all, this analysis suggests that environmental policy has a small impact on economic growth. Additionally, even the numerically small growth effects estimated in the simulation exercises are likely to be exaggerated given that several modeling assumptions amplify the economic growth effects of environmental policy. It should, however, be emphasized that even numerically small effects on a growth rate have large level effects in the long run. The simulation exercises indicate that the economic growth effect of an environmental policy change constitutes a substantial part of the overall welfare effect. These results suggest that static models and exogenous growth models leave out important welfare effects of environmental policy.
Concluding Remarks
In the light of this analysis, several directions of future research appear fruitful. First, this study illustrated the importance of a technology-adjusted environmental policy stringency measure (like the environmental tax revenue parameter, φ, in the above analysis). If such measures were estimated empirically, simulation exercises like the one conducted above would be much more precise. Next, I assumed that the entire tax revenue from the pollution tax was transferred to the representative household. It would be interesting to examine how economic growth is affected if the tax revenues are used to finance subsidies to parts of the R&D sector. Finally, the model developed in this paper might be useful when studying how pollution emissions interact with economic growth in developing economies. Pollution levels in developing economies are often high, and it is therefore likely that a tighter environmental policy could boost economic growth in these economies by reducing the negative effects on labor supply and productivity from pollution emission.
A Appendices
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. From (3.4), (3.8), and (3.12) it follows that:
From the above and (3.3) it can be shown that:
It follows directly that: P jt (Y jt ) > 0 and P jt (Y jt ) < 0. Define pollution intensity as:
Pollution intensity is then given by: Substituting (3.11) and (3.12) into (3.10) yields:
There is a global maximum for π f jt (Y jt ). Specifically, in the global maximum for π f jt (Y jt ):
The left hand side is constant. Meanwhile, the right hand side approaches infinity for Y jt approaching zero. The right hand side is monotonically decreasing in Y jt and approaches zero asymptotically. 
Dividing the value function by w t and using (3.27):
Taking the derivative with respect to time yields
where it is used that v it = 1/λ according to (3.23 
where the last equality follows from the formula:
Plotting the expression into (A.1) yields:
The expression can easily be rewritten as (3.30).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. From (3.30) and (3.31):
Substituting the expression from (A.2) into (3.9): Hence, D t must be zero, which implies that
It follows from (A.4) that L t = L, i.e. labor input in manufacturing is constant over time. Hence,
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. From (3.15), (3.16), (3.17), and (3.27) it follows that , which is denoted g B and given by: g B = n B η ln(ξ). As P t = (1/N )P t , it follows from (3.3) that P t andP t grow at the same rate denoted g P and given by:
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Differentiating (3.32), (3.33), and (3.34) with respect to φ:
Labor inputs in the production and abatement intermediate subsectors are given by
where the first equation follows from (3.16), (3.17), and (3.27), and the second equation follows from (3.21). Differentiating x and z with respect to φ yields dx dφ = −αχµ (1 − φ) 2 Γ < 0 and dz dφ = χµ 2 (1 − φ) 2 Γ > 0.
A.6 Model with CRRA utility
In this appendix, I show the main relations and results of the model from Section 3 when the instantaneous utility function is given by (5.1). The labor allocation of the economy can be expressed by the following three equations:
(1−α)(1−χµφ−φ) Σ 1 Ω 1
(1 − Σ 2 ) +
(1−µ)χµφ Ω 1 , (A.5) and (A.6 )
where Σ 1 ≡ 1 + (θ − 1) ln(γ)Λ A and Σ 2 ≡ (θ − 1)(λ/η) ln(γ)Λ B .
It turns out that the qualitative policy implications of the extended model are very similar to those of the model presented in Section 3. Consider the following proposition. Proof. Differentiating (A.5) with respect to φ yields
The expression is positive if
The expression is negative for the opposite inequality. Hence, (i) in Proposition 4 is proved.
The derivative of n A with respect to φ amounts to
If the derivative of L with respect to φ is negative or zero, it follows immediately that the above expression is negative. It then follows from the labor market clearing condition that n B is increasing in φ.
Assume that the derivative of L with respect to φ is positive. Then it is not straightforward to evaluate the sign of the derivative of n A with respect to φ. Instead, consider the following expression obtained from (A.6) and (A.7):
The derivative of (n B /L) with respect to φ amounts to
As the derivative of L with respect to φ is positive, this derivative is also positive. It is straightforward to show that this implies that the derivative of n B with respect to φ is positive, and then it follows from the labor market clearing condition that n A is decreasing in φ. This finishes the proof of (ii), and the proof of (iii) follows directly from (ii), (3.6), and (3.7).
A.7 Model with physical capital
In this appendix, I sketch a model closely related to the model presented in Section 3, but with a production process which incorporates physical capital. Relations similar to those presented in Section 3 will not be repeated.
In the final goods sector firms operate under monopolistic competition a la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . Firms produce using the production technology
where L jt is labor input for firm j. Final goods are aggregated as follows:
Final goods can either be consumed or transformed into (physical) capital: Y t = C t +Ī t , wherē In a steady state equilibrium, the labor allocation is given by
,Ω 1 ≡ αā 1 + ln(γ)
, n B =Ω 2 L − ρ η (1 + ln(ξ)) , Thus, in the long run the growth rates of output and pollution emission are reduced unambiguously, when the environmental policy is tightened.
A.8 Calibrating the model
The growth rate of pollution emission is given bẏ .9) Assuming that the growth rate ofẐ t is constant (as predicted by the model), the discrete time version of (A.9) is approximated as:P t = σ + βỸ t + t , where σ is a constant,X t ≡ ln (X t+1 /X t ), and t is the error term. Output and pollution emission are approximated by real GDP and the pollution emission index, respectively. Using data for the period 1970-2012 an OLS regression suggests that β is around 0.7 and statistically significant at the one pct. level.
A.9 Computing CCC
In steady state with κ = 0 welfare is given by:
The current consumption level that makes the representative household indifferent between the old and new economic growth rate is theC 0 that solves the equality:
, where g R A is the economic growth rate after the reform. Using this expression it is straightforward to computeC 0 /C 0 , and thereby the CCC stemming from a reduction in the economic growth rate.
The level effect on current consumption can be added directly to obtain the total CCC.
